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Wyckoff: Our Changing Common Law
OUR CHANGING C0MON LAWO
Or E. WYCKOFF"

F

ROM the time of Sir Edward Coke, who is said to have established the supremacy of the common law, and even before his
day, the common law system has ever been in the process of reformation. In the evolution of our jurisprudence it has experienced
something of the ebbs and flows that have marked the recessions
and the advances of the English speaking people during the last
six hundred years. At some points it has been nullified or superceded, at others it has been modified, but the general movement has
been toward development and extension to meet the changing social
and economic requirements of the people whom it served. These extensions have touched, and to some extent remolded, every branch
of our law. So comprehensive has been the movement, and so
permeating has been its influence, that no one has essayed to produce a treatise covering the broad field of our changing common
law, yet your president makes bold, though probably unwisely, to
discuss under the limit of time necessarily imposed here this difficult and limitless subject. It is obvious that only the broadest
general principles can be here considered. The nature of the subject does not permit of colorful or entertaining treatment, but its
imminence and importance call for present thought and attention.
There must be omitted a consideration of the customs, usages
and traditions out of which the common law had its birth, and the
origin of the administrative means by which these customs, usages
and traditions were crudely made operative; the influence of other
systems of jurisprudence on the creation and destiny of our own;
and the history of the substantive and procedural law which are at
once interesting to the lawyer and helpful to him in trying to
measure the extent and wisdom of the numerous changes now in the
process of the making. The history of the rapid and startling
changes in the development of the common law throughout the
centuries from the time of Glanville to this day would give us a
broader perspective and understanding in viewing the more rapid
innovations of the present decade.
Professor Wigmore has shown that, aside from the innumerable customs, rules and decrees which were devised for the regu* Address of the President of the West Virginia Bar Association, delivered
at the fifty-seventh meeting of that Association at White Sulphur Springs,

West Virginia, on October 17, 1941.

** President of the West Virginia Bar Association 1940-41; member of
the Grafton bar.
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lation of the affairs of some peoples of lesser consequence in the
history of the world, there have been established within historical
times sixteen legal systems. Of those sixteen, eight remain today,
and of these eight, three systems, the Mohammedan, the Romanesque
and our own, the Anglican, cover the greater part of the world's
population. The Anglican, being the youngest of them all, has
had the experience of all that has gone before upon which to draw
for its guidance.
From his study of these systems, Professor Wigmore concluded
that the growth and perpetuation of a legal system depend on the
development and survival of a highly trained professional class to
administer it, and, if that premise be correct, we may conclude that
from the days of the English Inns of Court down through the time
of the increasingly efficient universities and our colleges of law
with their highly trained faculties, has come a learned class of professional men that will be able to preserve our system and make
it adaptable to such necessities as society may in the future require,
if it be granted that other conditions necessary to its growth and
perpetuity be present.
It is of interest that we observe as a basis for this discussion
the conceptions of the common law as defined by some of our learned
jurists and commentators. The United States Supreme Court said
in the case of Kansas v. Colorado:
" ... the common law is but the accumulated expressions
of the various judicial tribunals in their efforts to ascertain
what is right and just between individuals in respect to private disputes.'"'Kent in his Commentaries defines the common law as including
those principles usages, and rules of action applicable to the government and security of persons and property which do not rest
for their authority upon any express or positive statute or other
written declaration, but upon statements of principles found in
the decisions of the courts, and, he says, it embraces that great
body of unwritten law founded upon general custom, usage, or
common consent, and based upon natural justice or reason.
A Minnesota court has said simply that "the common law is
the legal embodiment of practical sense.'
One definition, given
by a Mississippi court in the ease of Yazoo & i. V. R. R. v. Scott,
and which well measures up to a popular and modern conception,
says:
1 206 U. S. 46, 97, 27 S. Ct. 655, 51 L. Ed. 956 (1907).
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"The common law ... while, in most respects, the 'soul
of reason', is not always arrived at by an application of the
rules of logic, for its basis in the last analysis is nothing more
or less than expediency.. . ."'1
A definition that will be approved by many, given by a Florida
court in the case of Quinn v. Phipps, is that the common law is
"a method of juristic thought or manner of treating legal questions
worked out from time to time by the wisdom of mankind. It is a
'4
doctrine of reason applied to experience."
The only literature of the law, as recorded by the great writers,
has not only pointed out the history and the status of the law in
the writers' times, but it has by criticism and analysis indicated to
some extent the trend of the future development of the law.
We do not include with these sound analysts and far seeing
legal minds some of the recent prolific writers who have been
denominated by Karl N. Llewellyn, Professor of Jurisprudence,
of Columbia University, as "Jurisprudes". We are thinking of
the great writers who have consolidated the gains of the common
law, who have pointed out that which in time became archaic; those
who viewed sensibly and appraised wisely the values of rights secured, whose sound perception enabled them to understand that
rights of men may change with varying social and economic conditions, and that the remedies of the law must be made to synchronize with basic variations of the relations of men, but whose
perspective was broad enough to refuse to be led into error by
temperamental trends and abstractions. Glanville in the twelfth
century, Bracton in the thirteenth, Fortescue in the fifteenth, Coke
and Littleton in the early seventeenth, Blackstone in the eighteenth,
Kent in the nineteenth, Holmes in the twentieth, and others in their
times, have restated, clarified, refined, and made adaptable this
"legal embodiment of practical sense" in the most rapidly developing civilization of all recorded time, so that we are not surprised
that Justice Stone has said that one of the striking phenomena of
the development of the common law is the ever accelerated speed
with which its boundaries have been extended, and its content multiplied and refined. While in this effervescent period there is found
many places an inclination to rely less on precedent and to break
2 Sullivan v. Mlinneapolis & R. R. Ry., 121 Minn. 488, 494, 142 N. W. 3,
45 L. R. A. (N. s.)612 (1913).
a 108 Mss. 871, 881, 67 So. 491, L. R. A. 1915E 239, Ann. Cas. 1917E 880

(1915).o

4 93 Mg- 805, 824, 113 So. 419, 54 A. L. R. 1173 (1927).
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the continuity of the common law with the past, we may well ponder
the wisdom of the words of Coke when he said, "Let us pursue our
ancient authors, for out of the old fields must come the new come."
In the strict sense we have no federal common law, but it has
been observed that the very language and terms of the United
States Constitution tie it to the common law, and in the case of
Kansas v. Colorado, decided in 1907, it was said that "The language
of the Constitution . . could not be understood without reference
to the common law. '5
That it is the basis of jurisprudence in all of the states, excepting Louisiana, is indicative of the general satisfaction with
which our people have received its administration. That its course
throughout its history has been beset by numerous attempts to
supersede it and that it has survived to this day bespeak its utility
and its adaptability in administering the litigious and jurisprudential affairs of a people whose social and economic life has
gradually become more complex and difficult of orderly regulation.
What have been the nature and effect of these attempts made
to supersede the common law?
As has been pointed out by Dean Pound and others,, in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there was a movement to supersede it by a public law drawn on Romanist lines, conceived in terms
of centralized absolute royal authority and administrative supremacy. Also in the seventeenth, in the eighteenth and in the early
part of the nineteenth centuries there was a movement to reject
reported judicial experience as a guide to judicial determinations.
Later in the nineteenth century there was an advocacy of the system and refined academic conceptions of the modernized Roman
law, while during the same time there was a rapid growth of
impinging legislation. In the present century in the United States
there have been two notable movements designed to change the
operation of the common law system. The one is the recent reversion to the ancient union of administrative and judicial
functions of government. The crude and sometimes cruel system
of governmental administration existing prior to the development
of the common law system recognized no incongruity and no injustice in combining the accusatory and the judicial powers in one
authority, but we may in this connection recall that Holmes has
shown that the original purpose or motive promoting litigation was
revenge-not justice or reimbursement. The modern adminis'206 U. S. at p. 95.
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trative tribunals and agencies are rapidly extending their jurisdiction over both subject matter and persons and are at the same
time resisting efforts being made to bring their acts and proceedings within the realm of the sound judicial review and control
deemed by many to be necessary, if our system of jurisprudence is
to be maintained. Mr. Justice Stone has said:
"Perhaps the most striking change in the common law of
this country, certainly in recent times, has been the rise of a
system of administrative law, dispensed in the first instance
through authority delegated to boards and commissions composed of non-judicial officers."
Peoples who have adopted and lived within and by our common
law system have become free. Their rights and institutions have
been secure, and yet we hear today some saying in substance and
effect that there is a greater measure of security to be had by reverting to that union and multiplication of powers from which it
was thought that men and their governments had escaped long ago.
The other notable movement in this century which constituted
an attack upon judicial determinations and the supremacy of the
law was the effort, now fairly well spent, to control the decisions
of the courts by the recall of judges in order to support popular
clamor or to meet the political expediency of the moment. Efforts
by pressure groups and those having the power of appointment to
office to influence trends and constructions by the courts, other than
by ethical and educational processes, constitute direct assaults upon
the common law system and are alarming in the light of experience
and history.
These attempts to supersede the common law and these attacks
upon it have had much influence upon the course, nature and extent of its development, and in addition to these direct attempts at
supersession, other influences of immeasurable weight have operated
to speed its progression or to direct the course of its development.
These other influences are the written texts, encyclopedias, annotations, our legal literature, general reference works, commentaries,
and restatements, and greater than all of these has been the outburst of reforming legislation, which in the time of Edward I in
the latter part of the thirteenth century gave us the Statute of
Westminster, among others, and in the last century has given us innumerable statutes on innumerable subjects, and has set up new
rights and remedies and destroyed or modified others. Though
the age of legislation in its modern sense covers but a very small
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part of our legal history and many of our statutes have been merely
declaratory of the common law, the greater part of them have been
remedial, with many of them containing, as has been said before me,
a lawsuit in every word.
It may be said that these legislative and other changes moving
so rapidly before us are not of the common law- that the common
law in this country consists only of that which we adopted from the
mother country and the judge made law developed since that
adoption, but widening our perspective so as to cover the longer
eras in juristic thinking and development, we observe that these
innovations by construction and adaptation gradually became a
part of our system.
As a case in point in West Virginia where legislation on the
subject of the assignability of bills and notes determined by judicial
decision a question relating to the common law doctrine of
champerty, I quote you the language of part of the opinion of
Judge Haymond in the Supreme Court of Appeals case of Grahtam
v. Graham:
"It is claimed by the counsel for the appellant that the
said agreement C is void, because it amounts to champerty,
and he referred the court to the 4th book of Blackstone, side
page 135. The doctrine laid down by Blackstone upon this
subject has been very much modified by statute in this State.
For instance, as to the assignment of causes in action, or a
thing one hath the right to, but not the possession. By our
law notes and single bills are assignable, and the assignee may
sue in his own name. And accounts are also assignable, and
real estate to which a person hath the right, but not the possession, may be sold and conveyed.'
Excepting the younger members of the bar, the lawyers here
present have lived within the period of the substantial remaking
of the law of torts with particular reference to the rights and
liabilities of employer and employees. You are the first generation
of lawyers to have attempted the application of laws governing
hours and wages, though the Statute of Labourers in 1351 did attempt to regulate the disorganized labor market following the
scourge of the Black Death; you are the first in America to advise
clients respecting requirements as to sanitary conditions of employment, as to fair trade practices, the requirements of law in selling
coal upon the market, the rights of numberless pensioners, the bulk
sales law, the obligations upon the payers of income taxes, in6 10 W. Va. 355, 384 (1877).
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heritance, gift, social security, gross income, sales, privilege, and
other new forms of taxes, and some of you are among the first to
deal with laws relating to the rates of public utilities and laws
effecting other innovations.
More and more the liberties of the individual and minorities
are giving way to the demands of the majorities. Property as well
as personal rights are day by day being modified by statutes and
court decisions, and particularly by findings of administrative
bureaus. In the main, it may be said that many of these changes
were but the normal and necessary growth of our system of jurisprudence. It has been said that the rise of equity was but a great
change in the common law, and that the equities of today become
the laws of tomorrow. Hale said that he regarded equity as a part
of the common law. These transitions sometimes appear more start.
ling during their formative period than in retrospection, but there
is an all-important distinction to be made between normal and
necessary growth of the law on the one hand and immature conceptions of growth and planned supersession of the system on the
other.
Past time and events have shown that where justice should be
done and wise conclusions reached, there should be calm deliberation- not haste. It will be so in the future. Mr. Justice Holmes
wrote, "The man of action has the present, but the thinker controls
the future."
We are now living, legislating, litigating, deciding in a hurry.
Recognizing that some of our administrative agencies have fairly
well served in their fields, we have indiscriminately turned to administrative procedure in order to accomplish an end in a rush.
The importance of obtaining an exact result and the means of
reaching it seem to be of less consequence in this era of haste than
the popular demand for action and speedy results. Accelerated
action is the desideratum. We should not then be surprised to read
in a leading article on the subject of the changing rights of the
American citizen, published in July, 1939, the language: "The best
governed state is not the state that is governed least; it may be the
state that is governed Most."7
It will be understood that these observations relate to changes
being effected in our law and procedure during times of peace, and
7Matherly, Changing Bights of the Aneican Citizen (1939)

38 SouTH

ATL.A~Ic QuARTERLY 284.
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not to the necessities that may arise from the exigencies of a national emergency.
Mr. Justice Stone has said:
"We need to be reminded too that in the construction of
statutes establishing administrative agencies and defining their
powers there is little scope for the ancient shibboleth that a
statute in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed."
We have long held to the doctrine that there are three classes
of statutes to be strictly construed, namely, penal statutes, statutes
in derogation of common right, and statutes in derogation of the
common law, but Sedgwick in his Constructionof Constructionaland
Statutory Law brands such restrictive construction as "delusive
and fallacious".
In addition to the evolution of the new rights that we have
mentioned, the most significant trends in long established common
law doctrines, considering them very generally, are the inclination
to break away from the doctrine of precedent, the failure to hold
consistently to the ideal of the supremacy of the law, and the
tendency to depart from the right of trial by jury. The overruling of precedent is becoming much more frequent, and numerous published articles attacking the doctrine of stare decisis are
appearing. It is being widely advocated that the new practice of
administrative agencies in disregarding the rules of evidence and
the procedure known to the common law is necessary and wise in
view of changing social, governmental and industrial conditions.
Though some of these innovations have been of revolutionary proportions and consequence, it is the changes effected by construction
and reversals of precedent by our courts that probably are of the
greatest interest and significance to the members of the legal profession and those interested in the future of our system. Many
states are rapidly moving toward the restriction or elimination of
the right of trial by jury and the new rules of civil procedure
adopted by the federal courts are in harmony with this movement.
The innovations thus far mentioned, excepting as to the relaxing of the doctrine of stare decisis, are influences arising from
without the field of the common law considered in its more restricted sense as judge made law. Within that field, however, lie
the source and explanation of the growth of the principles of the
common law and the demonstration of their adaptability to the
fluxible status of our restless and highly industrialized people.
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It has been said by the Tennessee Court of Appeals that the
principles of the common law slumber in their repositories until the
occasion which calls for their exposition arises.8
The Right Honorable Lord Wright of Dudley, Master of the
Rolls, has observed that "The common law is a living organism."
The flexibility of the common law was concisely expressed in
the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in the case of
Hurtado v. California,"decided in 1884, wherein it was said:
". .. we shall be ready to acknowledge that it is better
not to go too far back into antiquity for the best securities for
our 'ancient liberties.'
It is more consonant to the true
philosophy of our historical legal institutions to say that the
spirit of personal liberty and individual right, which they
embodied, was preserved and developed by a progressive
growth and wise adaptation to new circumstances and situations
of the forms and processes found fit to give, from time to time,
new expression and greater effect to modern ideas of selfgovernment.
"This flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation
is the peculiar boast and excellence of the common law. Sir
James Mackintosh ascribes this principle of development to
Magna Charta itself. To use his own language:
" 'It was a peculiar advantage that the consequences
of its principles were, if we may so speak, only discovered
slowly and gradually. It gave out on each occasion only
so much of the spirit of liberty and reformation as the
circumstances of succeeding generations required and as
their character wouald safely bear. For almost five centuries it was appealed to as the decisive authority on behalf of the people, though, commonly so far only as the
necessities of each case demanded.' "1O
Because of the significance of the statement and its source, I
quote again somewhat at length from an opinion of the United
States Supreme Court, written by Mr. Justice Sutherland, in the
case of Funk v. United States," the following:
"It may be said that the court should continue to enforce
the old rule, however contrary to modern experience and
thought, and however opposed, in principle, to the general current of legislation and of judicial opinion, it may have become,
leaving to Congress the responsibility of changing it. Of
8 Jacob v. State, 3 Humph. 493, Ann. Cas. 1913E 1251 (Tenn. 1842).
9 110 U. S. 516. 4 S. Ct. 111, 28 L. Ed. 232 (1884).
10 110 U. S. at p. 530.
"1290 U. S. 371, 54 S. Ct. 212, 78 L. Ed. 231 (1933).
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course, Congress has that power; but, if Congress fail to act.
as it has failed in respect of the matter now under review, and
the court be called upon to decide the question, is it not the
duty of the court, if it possess the power, to decide it in accordance with present day standards of wisdom and justice rather
than in accordance with some outworn and antiquated rule of
the past? . . . That this court and the other federal cou4rts, in
this situation and by right of their own powers, may decline
to enforce the ancient rule of the common law [the rule which
denies the competency of one spouse to testify in behalf of the
other in a criminal prosecution] under conditions as they now
exist we think is not fairly open to doubt....
"The final question to which we are thus brought is not
that of the power of the federal courts to amend or repeal any
given rule or principle of the common law, for they neither
have nor claim that power, but it is the question of the power
of these courts, in the complete absence of congressional legislation on the subject, to declare and effectuate, upon common
law principles, what is the present rule upon a given subject
in the light of fundamentally altered conditions, without regard to what has previously been declared and practiced. It
has been said so often as to have become axiomatic that the
common law is not immutable but flexible, and by its own
principles adapts itself to varying conditions."12
Our West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in the case of
Currence v. Ralphsnyder, has followed the general trend and has
said in the opinion written by Judge Hatcher, concerning a certain
line of decisions, "That line of cases follows the common law, and
is not persuasive on us, as this Court is committed to a more liberal
' 18
view.
The common law lawyer holds finly to his faith in the rule
of precedent, but it is generally recognized that the rule is not an
unyielding one. Sir William Holdsworth and others have taken
the position that judicial decisions are but evidence of the law
which, they say, is sometimes misrepresented by bad precedents
which must be corrected. In commenting on the view of Holdsworth, Mr. Justice Stone has said that bad precedents must yield
to the better reason and that this qualification of the rule of stare
decisis will enable us to reach the golden mean between the extreme of flexibility and the extreme of rigidity and ultimately to
achieve a system which, though adaptable to the changing needs of
a changing society, is not without symmetry and continuity.
12290 U. S. at pp. 381-383.

is108 W. Va. 194, 198, 151 S. E. 700 (1929).
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The judge is constantly enlarging the field of the common law
by applying the old principles to new situations and by restricting
such principles at one point and extending them at another, and
underlying the most liberal decisions of our courts will be found
something of the rules, the concepts, the standards and principles
of the common law.
That this remolding process is constantly and surely shaping
and determining the destiny of our system of jurisprudence is
clearly apparent to the legal profession and is sufficiently pronounced to be generally recognized by some historians. James
Bryce in his American Commonwealth says:
"The Supreme Court has changed its color, i.e., its temper
and tendencies, from time to time according to the political
proclivities of the men who composed it. . . . Their action
flowed naturally from the habits of thought they had formed
before their accession to the bench and from the sympathy
they could not but feel for the doctrines on whose behalf they
had contended. . . . The Supreme Court feels the touch of
public opinion. Opinion is stronger in America than anywhere
else in the world and judges are only men."
In contemplating this appraisement by a historian of good
repute and the meaning of the rapidly growing changes in the law
of our system, we may recall for our consideration the observation
of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes when he said: "The life of the
law has not been logic; it has been experience."
In jurisprudence, as elsewhere in life, we can rely with a
greater degree of certainty upon experience than upon over refined abstractions or the popular demands of the hour. Experience
has shown that the two common law doctrines of due process and
supremacy of the law have afforded for our people the greatest
measure of protection of their individual rights and that they are
the means whereby public justice is assured. Probably all members of the bar would accept this statement as irrefutable. If so,
we can do no less than devote ourselves seriously to the maintenance
of these doctrines, and to that end we may best serve by effecting
sound reformations of the tenets and practices of the common law
which have become archaic or insufficient for present needs and by
vigorously resisting all ill-advised innovations of the law. The
legal profession has not sought or desired to synchronize the
changing of the law -with the transmutations of political movements
or with temporary social trends. Greater stability than that is
required in a system of jurisprudence. The profession has sought
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to synchronize the growth of the law with the enduring needs of a
growing people.
Of greatest influence in shaping the course of the common
law and in determining whether it shall live to better serve us or
whether it shall be superseded, are our judges. While it is expected
that the conclusions reached by judges will reflect to some extent
the training, the environment and the intellectual and spiritual
bent of the man personifying the judge, the judge who would
permit political expediency or other ulterior considerations to override his solemn duty is doubtless the most dangerous of all the
enemies of the common law system.
We are certain that in the development of the common law
such judges have been extremely rare and that only a few have not
been worthy of the encomium of Plucknett upon Bracton of whom it
was said that while he was constantly in his government's judicial
service, he took no part in partisanship, serving all impartially.
Departure from that high, buf indispensable, standard could quickly result in the loss of all progress made through the centuries in
the common law system.
The legal profession recognizes that the law is not an exact
science having attained its full stature and complete efficacy, but
that it is a growing one- indeed, a social science; that a perfect
administration of justice by the courts has not been attained; that
corrections of errors in precedents must be made; that there must
be an extension of legal principles to meet and serve an expanding
civilization, and that avoidable delays must be prevented, but they
believe there is no gainsaying that if there be injustices and insufficiencies arising under the present well guarded judicial system,
these injustices and insufficiencies may be expected to increase
many fold if the safeguards of the common law be removed or made
too elastic.
There is upon us a special responsibility and duty to our fellow countrymen to try to point out the grave dangers that lie in
the abandonment of the anchorage that the supremacy of the law
has afforded us throughout the storms of our past national life,
and to do all that may be done to impress upon them the truth that
life has produced no better guide for the future than the experiences of the past.
Out of the tyranny of government, the immature, prejudiced
and emotional decisions of rulers, and out of the ambitions and
weaknesses of men, arose the necessity and occasion for the de-
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velopment of the common law. Its primal function to protect the
rights of free men from the rapacity of individuals and of government has been very well performed. Remembering that the moral
codes and the precepts of the Bible are a part of the common law,
and remembering that the obligation is always upon us to see that
the law and its remedies are made commensurate with the needs of
our growing civilization, there arises for solution the difficult problem of deciding how far a sound system of jurisprudence can go
toward socializing the law and the institutions of a people without
yielding the essential stability and uniformity that make it sound
and certain. In changing a system let us remember that the seeming needs of the moment may not prove to be the certain needs of
tomorrow.
There is the oft told story that because of the opinion given
by Bacon to King James I to the the effect that the judges of King's
Bench had improperly permitted a question relating to the King's
prerogative to be raised without suspending the trial to first inquire
the pleasure of the Crown, Chief Justice Coke and his associate
judges were summoned before the King and asked if they ought
not stay such a proceeding. After the associate judges had answered "Yes, yes, yes," Coke replied in immortal language, "When
the case happens, I shall do that which shall be fit for a judge
to do."
May our devotion to our faith in the supremacy of the law be
no less constant and enduring.
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